Using patents as indicators of inventive activity, this article characterizes the concentration of origins of invention from 1976 to 2010, and how these changed over time. The analysis finds pervasive deconcentration in virtually every area related to ICT, but it can explain only a small part of this trend. Deconcentration happens despite the role of lateral entry by existing firms. New firm entry drives part of the deconcentration, but this alone cannot explain the change. A single supply factor in the market for ideas, such as the breakup of AT&T, also cannot explain the trend. Finally, eleven percent of patents change hands through mergers and acquisitions activity, but this does not make up for the declines in concentration in the origins of invention.
Introduction
The market structure for the Information and Communications Technology (ICT) equipment industry has undergone enormous change in the last four decades. Thirty years ago, most innovation took place in established firms, in large laboratories such as Bell Labs and IBM Labs (Rosenbloom and Spencer, 1996) . Decades ago, such labs began to lose their prominence to widespread, decentralized, and small-scale innovators. The trend goes by many names in many analyses. In this study we use the label "divided technical leadership," or DTL for short. This is the framework put forward in Bresnahan and Greenstein (1999) , which argues that DTL contributes to high rates of firm entry and exit, and that may occur without changing the concentration at the platform level. DTL plays a key role in shaping a market environment that nurtures open innovation (Chesbrough, 2003) , supports open and proprietary platforms (Gawer, 2010 , Greenstein, 2010 , and encourages "innovation from the edges" (Greenstein, 2015) . DTL also contributes to a market structure in which a dispersed set of market participants produces a range of new innovative prototypes for potential acquisition, so it plays a key role in the externalization of R&D by large firms, who use acquisitions of smaller firms for many of their innovative activities (Gans, Hsu, and Stern, 2002) . Firms such as Cisco, IBM, and Apple participate in such activities, each of which have made more than one hundred acquisitions over the last two decades.
While the presence of DTL has received notice, its causes have not been examined. In part this is due to the slow pace of change in market structure. Large scale DTL did not arise instantaneously; rather, it has gradually emerged in different parts of ICT markets, and only over long time spans -several decades -would an observer expect stark differences to become apparent, and amenable to statistical analysis. Against such challenges in observation, this study offers the first statistical information and econometric analysis of the long run causes behind DTL. Accordingly, the research goals are both descriptive and causal, and measurement challenges determine the lengths we can pursue in both.
We first establish some novel facts. Does statistical evidence of long-term change show a deconcentration in the sources of inventive ideas, as held by conventional models of DTL? The article characterizes the concentration in the origins of inventions in the ICT equipment industry in a given year. Next we describe changes over time. To construct measures of the origins of invention, the study examines the concentration of granted patents in ICT equipment in the period from 1976 to 2010, which accounts for roughly 14 percent of all US patents. The study utilizes a data set constructed from XML and text files of patents granted by the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) between 1976 and 2010. The data covers four more recent years than the NBER patent data files, the standard data source for many studies on patents.
1 The novel length of time covered is essential for realizing our research goals, as the economic forces should manifest in slow changes, if at all, and at varying 1 For details on the NBER patent data files, see Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001) .
paces in different technical areas. In addition, this length of time accounts for a unique event, the dot-com boom, which is coincident with the acceleration in patenting in the late 1990s. Finally, the new data contains standardized patent assignee names that enable patent data to be linked to other information about mergers and acquisitions (M&A) activity. As a result, mergers of both publicly traded and private firms can be examined.
The study supports the prevailing view about historical trends in DTL. We find a trend in deconcentration in the cumulative ownership of active patents. The analysis measures considerable variation in the size and scope of the changes, with some segments of ICT equipment undergoing dramatic changes. For example, while on average the top twenty-five firms accounted for 59 percent of the patent stock in 1986, the top twenty-five firms accounted for only 50 percent of the patent stock by 2010. Furthermore, the trend emerges in starker terms when we restrict the sample to high-quality patents, with a decline in top twenty-five firms' ownership from 65 to 51 percent in the patent stock over the same period.
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Why does this deconcentration arise? On the demand side, we look at the demand for inventive ideas by examining the merger market: does the emergence of an active merger market cause this deconcentration? Rather than own all the inputs into creating ideas that lead to patents, many large firms increasingly let others focus on that activity and make the purchase after the patent is granted. 3 Accordingly, we perform a (first-ever) census of such merger activity for ICT equipment, involving extensive data-matching (described below). The study finds that M&A activity results in the transfer of approximately 11 percent of the entire patent stock and 12 percent of the high-quality patent stock in the ICT equipment industry. Though the intensity of patent transfer through M&A is associated with a slight decrease in concentration for high-quality patents, the size of this transfer is not enough to revert the composition of ownership to its predeconcentration levels in any segment. Moreover, in the regression analysis, merger activity and intensity, which proxies for demand for externalized invention, cannot explain variance in concentration between segments. We conclude that, while the trend towards deconcentration has not been due to, or reversed by, firm strategies to externalize R&D activity.
On the supply side we ask about several causes: does economies of scope, reduced entry costs, decline in leading firms, or the location of the invention drive this deconcentration? One hypothesis stresses that large firms may utilize economies of scope by entering other technology areas, which may appear as increased or decreased concentration, depending on the size of the entry. 4 We use such lateral entry as a proxy for economies of scope and find evidence that ownership concentration increases with lateral entry, i.e., that economies of scope are not a cause of deconcentration. Next we examine evidence that de novo firm entry caused it, and we find mixed evidence. There is little evidence that non-US firm entry caused the change, which is another common hypothesis (reflecting a growth in imports and exports in the US economy over this period). 5 Rather, established changes in concentration may come from two distinct areas of the ownership distribution: 1) declines in the leading, large firms and 2) an increase of invention in the small, "tail" firms within the US. These entry results are consistent with the growth of small firms as a source of ideas, perhaps as part of redistribution from other domestic large firms.
We further explore a popular hypothesis about large firms: does the decline in the importance of the very largest firms merely reflect a decline in their importance in downstream 4 For economies of scope in technology see e.g. Chen, Williams, and Agarwal (2012) , Leiponen and Helfat (2010), and Miller (2006) . 5 As with the rest of the literature, we are somewhat cautious in our interpretation of foreign firms. A patent owned by Sony, for example, will appear as a US patent due to the location of its US-based subsidiary. As with the prior literature (e.g., Hall, 2005) , we focus on changes due to US patents with US assignees and non-US assignees, and examine whether the surge in patenting with Asian and European assignees accounts for change.
markets? 6 The preponderance of evidence suggests this is not the primary cause of change (though we also find a few exceptions). More specifically, we find that long-term trends in deconcentration cannot be fully accounted for by the divestiture of AT&T, or the loss in commercial leadership at IBM, Motorola, or any other recognizable firm in the industry. Hence, we can reject the most sweeping version of the hypothesis that points to one antitrust case, one company's strategic error, or the break-up of one large, leading innovator of yesteryear as the cause for deconcentration.
Relation to prior research
Our study relates to the research streams in two main channels. First, it relates to the literature on DTL, as noted, and, more broadly, to an analysis of the causes of market leadership and incentives in inventive activities. Following this literature, 7 we generally distinguish between product market leadership and technological leadership and focus on the latter. We follow the literature that hypothesizes that the dispersion of capabilities over frontier technology shapes firm behavior.
Second, the impact of M&A activity on the technological leadership relates to the literature on R&D incentives in the shadow of M&A and to the literature on start-up commercialization, also noted above. We differ from prior literature with our focus on understanding the causes behind changes in technical leadership in more recent decades. Finally, this is the first study to put these together. That is, we investigate the extent of, and causes behind, deconcentration in invention in the ICT equipment industry, and the potentially countervailing M&A mechanism.
We follow prior research that considers the resource-based and industrial organization streams together by considering industry and firm effects in a unified framework. 8 We differ from Skilton and Bernardes (2015) , however, in that we distinguish between technology markets and product markets, and stress competition and entry into the former instead of the latter.
6 See Miller (2006) for the relation between technology and product markets of firms. 7 Greenstein, 2010 and 2015 review the literature on computing and commercial Internet, in particular. 8 See e.g. Mauri and Michaels (1998) , Hashai (2015) , and Misangyi et al. (2006) We further build on prior research into patenting, which touches on related themes, but has not examined the sources of deconcentration. Kortum and Lerner (1999) associated the increase in US patenting activity to an increase in US innovation and to changes in the management of R&D, which may have included actions such as reallocating efforts to more applied problems with higher patent yields. Kim and Marschke (2004) concluded that the increased patenting activity was due to increases in R&D in some sectors and increases in the rate of patenting in the computing, electronics, and auto sectors. Hall (2005) found that growth occurred in complex product industries such as telecommunications and concluded that this increase also spilled over to those firms' patenting behavior in other industries.
In our study, in contrast, we focus on the distribution of the increase in patenting between firms within each technology class; in other words, we differ in our focus on technical leadership in the technology class level, and its concentration. Indeed, our up-to-date data on patents allow us to answer an open questions posed by Hall (2005) , namely, "What happened during the 1990s?
Did the positive premium for entry with patents continue during the rapid growth of the computing and electronics sector in the late 1990s? Has the growth in patenting continued to be due almost entirely to U.S. firms in computing and electronics?"
The deconcentration results also relate to the research stream on how incentives change with competition. We provide evidence of the increased competitive conditions in the ideas market. This increased competition may be indicative of higher incentives to innovate. However, there are also limits. The results cannot distinguish between a model of monotonic increase in innovation due to more competition, or merely a movement on the "upward" part of the "inverted U" relationship hypothesized by Aghion et al. (2005) . Our results are consistent with both.
The discussion of the M&A activity of the established firms in our study relate to the startup commercialization framework of Arora, Fosfuri, and Gambardella (2004) ; Gans, Hsu, and Stern (2002) . This research posits that a startup innovator with a successfully developed, commercial technology faces a choice between competing with incumbent firms in the market and cooperating through selling or licensing the technology to the incumbent firm. Our study also proceeds from the same premise. In contrast, we provide a measure of all acquisitions of patents, measure its importance for all inventive activity, and find it plays only a small role. inventive ideas in a wide set of related industries. This will provide just enough of a brief overview to guide our framework for the statistical exercise.
Historical Overview
Prior to the 1980s, the ICT equipment industry consisted of various segments, depending on whether it was oriented towards computing, as it was then understood, or communications, namely, voice or data. Both of these segments were highly concentrated in final goods markets. At the end of the 1970s, IBM dominated the computing segment with its mainframe systems and the components built around those systems. It also dominated the personal computer system market for a short time, growing a small systems division that in 1984 was the third largest computer company on the planet (behind Digital Equipment Corporation and IBM itself).
Starting in the mid-1980s and accelerating thereafter, IBM lost market shares in personal computers and in many of the peripheral markets. After the introduction of the IBM PC in 1981, a wide range of firms entered into printers, software, component production, local area networks, and more. In the 1990s, Microsoft and Intel began to assert control over an increasing fraction of valuable components within the PC market; nonetheless, a large number of firms played a role in many of its segments.
Before the 1980s, AT&T was the dominant provider of networking equipment in the voice segment, largely due to its regulated monopoly position in telecommunication services:
approximately 90 percent of AT&T's equipment purchases were supplied from its equipment subsidiary, Western Electric. The voice segment was based on circuit-switching technology and provided the infrastructure mainly for local and long-distance telephone companies. Furthermore, AT&T fought regulations that ended the requirement that any equipment attached to its network be supplied by AT&T, even on the end-user site. The purchase behavior and network attachment requirement of AT&T restricted entry into the telecommunications equipment markets, thus carrying AT&T's dominant position in telecom services into the telecom equipment sector.
AT&T eventually lost most of those fights, which yielded change, but slowly. The networking and Internet revolution of the 1990s blurred the distinction between different segments of ICT equipment (Lee 2007) . This process sometimes receives the label "convergence," which means that previously independent product market segments increasingly become substitutes or complements in demand. On the computing side, systems of PCs and workstations were initially hooked together with a local area network (LAN). Over time, clientserver systems within large enterprises and across ownership boundaries were established. Novell, 10 See, e.g., Crandall and Waverman (1995) for a detailed discussion.
3Com, Oracle, and Cisco were among the firms with dominant positions in this era. 11 With widespread Internet use, the scope of ambitions became quite large, touching on virtually every economic activity in which transmission of information played an important role. This period was marked by economic changes to the applications of computing and communications, as well as any related upstream or downstream activity. It was marked by optimism and labeled "the dot-com bubble," in recognition of the many startups that ended with the top-level domain name "com." Fourth, has the externalization of R&D by established firms merely changed the structure of the origins of invention, but not its concentration as it relates to final output markets?
Theoretical Framework
This section provides a brief overview of our framework. It fixes a few key ideas and provides a roadmap for later developments.
Following prior literature Gambardella, 2001, Gans, Hsu and Stern, 2002) , we divide the industry into an upstream sector that supplies invention and a downstream sector that supplies products. The downstream sector employs inventions from the upstream sector in production.
The literature on the rise of DTL focuses on the increasing infrequency of situations where one firm has a monopoly over an idea. In practice, these ideas come from very specific classes of technologies and map into very specific product markets. The literature stresses that such monopolies are less likely to arise where many technical substitutes can emerge. Substitutes are more likely to emerge in settings where many potential inventors generate similar ideas and where entry into production of ideas is less costly.
We considered a wide range of alternative ways of measuring settings where many potential inventors generate similar ideas. For reasons explained below, we settled on a top-twentyfive concentration ratio over the ownership of inventive ideas, which we label as C25, in technological class, indexed as i. Illustrating the concept, a technological class i is said to be more concentrated if the largest twenty-five firms own 80 percent of the inventive ideas, instead of, say, 50 percent of the ideas in that technology class.
The literature discussed many related measures of concentration for a sector, which are book-ended by two concepts, one related to the flow of new ideas, another related to the stock of ideas that firms own and use. A firm accumulates ownership of many inventions by accumulating ownership of patents over the active lifetime of patents, which we coin the patent stock, which corresponds to the discounted sum of patent flow over the firm's history, less the expired (old)
patents.
The existing literature on DTL suggests the flow of ideas is relevant for fostering entry into product markets, for example, while the stock of ideas is relevant for new combinations of technologies fostering entry or industrial change. In this paper we focus on the stock of ideas, though our qualitative results also hold in the flow of ideas, the results of which we provide in Appendix B.
Based on the set of active patents in a given year, we calculate the patent stock by discounting the patents from prior years using the declining balance formula. More specifically, we calculate the cumulative patent stock of firm i in period t by the following formula:
where we use the depreciation rate, δ, of 15 percent. 13 This depreciation accounts for two known factors: the obsolescence of patents over time as the technology becomes older and irrelevant, and the shorter remaining active time of older patents. Both of these imply a lower value for the patents.
14 Some of the writing on DTL suggests that many patents are not relevant for entry, and only high-quality patents facilitate entry. The above definition can be modified to focus on the stock and flow of only high quality ideas.15
The first key question concerns changes in the concentration of ownership over time. Is the evidence consistent with decreasing concentration over time? We focused on the question for each i, namely,
13 The returns to patents are estimated to decline by 10% to 20% per year (Schankerman and Pakes, 1986) . In calculating the patent stock, use of the declining balance formula with 15% depreciation rate is prevalent in the literature (e.g., Griliches, 1989; Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg, 2005; and Hall and MacGarvie, 2010) . 14 For the purposes of calculating the patent stock, we consider a patent active for twenty years, starting with the patent filing year, or for seventeen years, starting from the patent grant year, whichever comes later. 15 In this study we provide results for patents that receive the bulk of citations, which are presumed to be of higher quality. We define high quality as the top quartile within each technology class-year group cells, in terms of citations received. For details, see Appendix A3.
Generally, we find below that a wide range of technology classes did become more deconcentrated. This motivates the second question, concerning the causes of less or more changes in concentration over time. In general, our approach identifies the causes of the variance in changes of concentration between different technology classes. That is, we posit:
The literature on DTL frames the open question: what factors caused changes in concentration? There are various theories on why the changes in concentration arose. We divide these theories into two distinct groups: those concerning the supply and the demand of technology.
As our review of the history suggests, important supply-side factors include the decline of dominant firms, increasing economies of scope across technology sectors, changes in entry costs for small or foreign firms, and the cost of diffusing ideas. Important demand-side factors include the increasing use of mergers by leading firms to obtain invention from external sources, increasing acceptance of technical products from unbranded firms by users, and the increasing use of open standards that permit customers to buy interoperable products from more than one supplier.
We now discuss these factors in detail. We will discuss, and later construct measures for, all supply side factors, while the latter two demand factors will be absorbed into time trends, so we will be able to focus only on the demand for mergers.
On the demand side for inventive ideas we look at the merger market. In studies of invention, patent applications reflect only the invention created by the patent applicant and do not take into account alternative mechanisms of obtaining patents, including acquisition of patents or acquisition of other patent assignees. Rather than own all the inputs into creating ideas that lead to patents, many large firms increasingly let others focus on that activity and make the purchase after the patent is granted. 16 We consider the acquisition of patents through acquisition of other patent assignees a source of demand for invention and construct a measure of Merger Intensity to account for this phenomenon. In this setting, a higher Merger Intensity implies a lower transaction cost of absorbing ideas from small firms.
The location of the inventive activity constitutes a supply side factor in deconcentration.
Metropolitan areas may provide an ecosystem that nurtures small firms, providing smaller entities with access to a highly-skilled work force and an ecosystem of complementary services within which to thrive. 17 Such an ecosystem may result in metropolitan areas substituting for large, established firms, hence enabling outsourcing of invention. Alternatively, a high geographic concentration of patent origins may be indicative of high entry costs or fewer sources for diffusing the underlying know-how, leading to concentration of economic activity in a smaller set of urban areas. The former would result in a decrease in concentration of ownership while latter would result in an increase in the concentration of ownership. We consider this an empirical question.
Firm entry into innovative activities is another supply side factor that provides a theory of deconcentration (Hall, 2005, and Kortum and Lerner, 1999, among others) . In our framework, firm entry captures the level of transaction costs of entry into the market for ideas, with lower costs implying higher entry. When we focus on only foreign entry, we then capture the transaction costs of entry by non-US firms.
In addition to firms entering into the ICT equipment industry from outside, firms may also be active in one ICT equipment class and later move to a new ICT equipment class. We consider such firms lateral entrants. We theorize that a higher lateral entry level implies higher economies of scope across different technology classes. If the firm conducting the lateral entry is larger than the firms in its new technology area, then lateral entry would reduce concentration, and vice versa.
Therefore, the impact of lateral entry on concentration of ownership is an empirical question.
The final supply-side factor we consider is product market leadership. Product markets constitute the downstream for innovation markets, and a fragmented product market is more conducive to the commercialization of the upstream invention (Gambardella and Giarratana 2013) .
We theorize that a more concentrated product market, with few firms leading, would result in less entry into upstream inventive activity due to the lower probability of success in commercialization. This is further strengthened by the conventional wisdom that the breakdown of AT&T caused the deconcentration in patent ownership. We lack data on the links between patent technology classes and product market classification, therefore, instead of using product market concentration measures, we use the presence of a big firm in an attempt to proxy product market leadership.
Data
Patents are one of the most utilized sources of information in the innovation literature. The use of patent data as a proxy for inventive activity dates back to Schmookler (1951) and Griliches (1990) .
Since then, an extensive literature on using patents as indicators of innovative activity has developed. 18 Here we follow this literature and focus on patents granted in the ICT equipment industry as a proxy for the origins of innovative activity. Since pursuing questions related to DTL led us to modify the practices underlying existing patent datasets widely in use, we first devote space to explaining our overlap with and departures from the existing literature. We then establish changes in the level of ownership composition of new and cumulative innovative activity, and then link these changes to underlying supply-and demand-side factors. Supply-side factors include new entry, lateral entry (a firm's economies of scope), and growth; the demand-side factor we utilize is the M&A activity of established firms.
18 See, e.g., Griliches (1990) and Nagaoka, Motohashi, and Goto (2010) .
The standard source for patent data has been the NBER patent data files. We are concerned that M&A is not the only channel for transferring ownership of patents between firms. Licensing and outright sale of patents are two other channels, both of which provide additional information about the market demand for ideas. 19 However, comparison with Serrano (2010) leads us to believe that a merger is a very good proxy for demand. Serrano records that 13.5
19 See Arora and Gambardella (2010) and Serrano (2010) .
percent of all granted patents are traded over their life-cycle; we obtain a similar scale of transfer (11%) through M&A activity, which suggests that over 80 percent (11/13.5 > .8) of the transfers in ownership of patents measured by Serrano occur due to M&A.
Concentration and Other Measures
In this section we describe the market structure, technology supply, and technology demand proxies we use in our empirical framework.
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Our main variable is the patent ownership concentration in a technology class. We capture the ownership concentration of granted patents in each technology class-year group as the share of top firms in the ICT equipment industry. More specifically we create variables ‫1ܥ‬ ௦௧ , ‫2ܥ‬ ௦௧ , …, ‫52ܥ‬ ௦௧ , where ‫ܺܥ‬ ௦௧ is the share of patents applied for by the top X firms within the technology class-year bucket and eventually granted. In each year we reselect the top firms; in other words, even though the number of firms used to calculate CX is kept constant at X, the set of firms may be different from period to period. We stop at ‫52ܥ‬ ௦௧ because in many of the technology class-year buckets, the top twenty-five firms reach 100 percent ownership in the early years of our sample. On average the top twenty-five firms in a technology class-year bucket own 55 percent of high quality patents. However, as we discuss in the next section, there is considerable variation in this concentration over time.
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In analyzing the changes in concentration, we construct variables to capture demand-side and supply-side factors. On the demand side, we use merger intensity, and on the supply side, we use geographic concentration, new firm entry, lateral firm entry, and product market leadership.
We now provide details of each measure.
20 Table 3 provides a summary of these variables. 21 In this context, more general measures of concentration, including Gini coefficients and HHIs for each patent class-year group, could be constructed. In Appendix C we discuss our choice of C25 further, repeat our analyses using these alternative measures of concentration and discuss implications.
A source of demand for invention is the acquisition of patents through acquisition of other patent assignees. In our theoretical framework, a higher merger activity is indicative of a lower cost of absorbing ideas from acquired firms. We construct a measure of Merger Intensity to account for this phenomenon. The merger intensity in a technology class in a year is the ratio of total patent stock transferred through assignee acquisitions to the total stock of patents in that year. On average, each year around 1.1 percent of existing high-quality patent stock is transferred through M&A activity (Table 3) , with considerable variation across different technology sectors. Though this may seem small on the surface, it is not in practice. We will show that around 12 percent of high quality patents change hands through the merger and acquisition of patent assignees. In our theoretical framework, the higher merger intensity is indicative of a lower cost of absorbing ideas from acquired firms.
The location of inventive activity is another supply side factor we consider. We use In an effort to capture the impact of firm entry, we have three classes of entry variables. In the first class, patent-weighted entry level, we construct two measures of entry based on the previous patenting activity of the firm: new entry and lateral entry. Firm i is considered a new entrant to technology class j in period t, if the firm does not have any patents in any of the ICT equipment classes prior to period t and has at least one patent in technology class j in period t.
When such an entry occurs, we consider all patents of firm i in period t in technology class j to be patents by a new entrant and calculate the new entry share by dividing the total number of new entry patents by the total number of patents in technology class j in period t. Firms that have no prior ICT equipment inventive activity produce, on average, 3.7 percent of the patents stock in a technology class.
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Another supply-side factor is economies of scope, which we capture with lateral entry of firms from one technology sector to another. More specifically, we consider firm i a lateral entrant to technology class j in period t if the firm did not have any patents in technology class j prior to period t, had at least one patent in another ICT equipment technology class prior to period t, and has at least one patent in class j in period t. We then calculate the lateral entry share as the ratio of patents by lateral entrants in period t in class j to the total patent count in period t in class j. On average 2.7 percent of high quality patents come from lateral entrants.
Taking into account that the entry of a firm may not fully materialize within one year, we also construct entry variables with a four-year time window, in which we consider any entry over the previous period a new entry of the current period. The extended time window increases the new entry share from 3.7% to 25.8%, and lateral entry share increases from 2.7% to 7.7%.
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The two entry variables, new entry share and lateral entry share, proxy for patent-count weighted entry into a technology. We should note that when combined, these two variables capture the inverse of the serial dependence of patenting by firms already in a technology class. In other words, considering the 3.7 percent new entry and 2.7 percent lateral entry averages, we deduce that on average 93.6 percent (100-3.7-2.7) of patents come from firms that already had patents in 22 Note that in this setting the sample is restricted to high-quality patents, hence the entry variables capture entry into the high-quality patent pool rather than entry into the entire patent pool. In other words, a firm with many lowquality patents and no high-quality patent in prior periods would be considered an entrant in the first period it produces a high-quality patent. 23 The dramatic increase in new entry share is by construction. In the 1-year measure the patent stock from only the entry year is considered, whereas in the 4-year measure each firms' 4-year patent stock is included.
a technology class in prior periods. As a result, when we include both entry variables in the model, we also account for serial dependence.
The second class of entry variables is the growth in the number of firms active in a technology class. Using simple firm counts, we calculate the growth in the number of firms over time. We see that on average the number of firms has increased by 9 percent every year for both the US and foreign firms.
The growth in the number of patents constitutes our third class of independent variables.
We see that on average the patent count has grown by 10 percent every year (10% in domestic and 12% in foreign firms). When we take into account the 9 percent average yearly increase in the number of firms, which is less than the 10 percent growth in patent count, we deduce that patent growth is coming from both entrants and incumbents.
The final class of control variables in our model consists of proxies for an increase or decrease in product market leadership: dummies for the presence of a big firm. Conventional wisdom that the breakdown of AT&T caused the deconcentration in patent ownership calls for these controls. In an attempt to discern whether the existence of big firms, namely AT&T, Motorola, and IBM, have an impact on the concentration, we include lagged indicators for their existence among the top five patent applicants. We see that the presence of AT&T is somewhat dwarfed by the strong presence of IBM: IBM is among the top five patent applicants in 54 percent of technology class-year cells, whereas AT&T and Motorola are in the top five patent applicants in only 41 and 32 percent of the cells, respectively.
Deconcentration of Patent Ownership Historical trends
We begin by presenting the broad changes in the distribution of ownership shares over our sample period. At the head of the ownership distribution, the number of firms that has more than 5% of shares in any technology class drops from 66 in 1986 to 60 and then to 47 in 1996 and 2006, respectively. 24 The question is then on where this drop is shifting to, to the middle or the tail of the size distribution. Figure 1 presents these trends for the firms that have less than 5% ownership share. In Panel A, we observe that the number of firms that have between 0.5% to 5% share also drops from 1986 to the following decades, and this drop is also exhibited for firms that has 0.35% or higher share in Panel B. On the other hand, we see a secular increase in the very small end of the distribution: the number of firms that has less than 0.15% of patent stock share increases from 1986 to 1996, and then again from 1996 to 2006. For the 0.15% to 0.35% ownership share range, the increase happens between 1986 to 1996, but then there is a reduction in the following decade.
These results suggest that the top firms (along with the mid-size firms having more than 0.35% ownership share) lose patent stock ownership share to the very small end of the firm size distribution over the last two decades.
When we take a closer look at the historical ownership trends. We now focus on capturing these leadership dynamics in a broader sense by characterizing these long term trends in our endogenous variable. We construct and analyze a measure of concentration across the thirty ICT equipment technology classes. To capture the dynamics of patent ownership, we calculate the patent stock variable-the number of active patents a firm has been granted since 1976 absent expired patents.
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We use ‫52ܥ‬ ௦௧ , the share of top twenty-five firms in patent stock, as our measure of concentration. We discuss this choice of the concentration measure further in Concentration and
Other Measures Section. We now turn to Table 1 to observe this deconcentration trend across all technology classes. The patent grants may come many years after a patent is applied for, and this delay is coined as the patent application-grant delay. The convention in the literature on patents is to use the patent application year as the year of the invention because the application year is closed to the actual creation of the idea; whereas the delay, hence the grant year, is a function of other factors including the workload and staffing issues at the USPTO. In this study, we follow this convention, and use the patents applied for and granted between 1976 and 2010.
share across technology classes follows a gradual decline over the years from 65 percent in 1986 to 51 percent in 2007.
We now investigate potential causes of this deconcentration across technology classes.
Industry insiders attribute this deconcentration to the breakdown of AT&T in 1982 during the deregulation of the telecommunications industry. To see if this claim holds in a first pass through the data, we calculate a simple statistic, the number of firms that contribute 90 percent or more of the changes in ‫52ܥ‬ ௦௧ , the share of top twenty-five firms, over our sample period. The results are presented in Table 2 , which reports the changes for high quality ICT equipment patents. We see that of the 29 classes with deconcentration, in only six classes are three or fewer firms responsible for 90 percent or more of the reduction in ‫52ܥ‬ ௦௧ . In the remaining 23 classes there is an industry-wide deconcentration trend, which suggests that the breakdown of AT&T, or another leading firm, cannot be the sole reason for the established deconcentration. The qualitative observations remain the same when we remove the restriction on the high quality patents and consider the entire patent sample.
Role of acquisitions
We have shown that the top twenty-five firms in the ICT equipment industry hold a smaller share of the patent stock than they did two decades ago. However, these analyses consider only the inhouse production of patents and do not take into account the patents acquired through alternative mechanisms, including acquisition of innovative firms. We see tremendous number of acquisitions taking place in the ICT equipment industry, and the impact of the transfer of patents through acquisitions on concentration depends on the status of the target and the acquirer. In cases in which the buyer is simply supplementing its existing portfolio of patents by acquiring a target active in the same technology class, then ownership becomes more concentrated. However, if the acquirer is simply entering a new technology class by acquiring a target active in that technology class, then the ownership concentration does not change in that technology class.
We resort to the M&A data to proxy for the demand for invention and to see the magnitude of patent transfers through M&A in the ICT equipment industry. In 1,881 of the M&A deals (9%) in our sample, both the acquirer and the target firm have at least one ICT equipment patent and, in 1,127 deals (6%), only the target has ICT equipment patents. Please note that transfers of patents take place in approximately one out of seven (3,008 out of 19,878) M&A deals involving ICT equipment patent holders (See Appendix A4, and Table A3 ).
The sheer ratio of M&A deals with patent transfers may not translate into a large number of patents if the target firms possess only a few patents. To assess the share of patents transferred through M&A, we report the patent stock for the ICT equipment industry and for the firms that were targeted in an M&A deal in Table 5 . We calculate the patent stock using the declining balance formula as described above. The total stock of acquirers includes patents by the acquirers independent of the year they make acquisitions. As an example, the patents of a firm that makes an acquisition in 1997 are accounted for in the patent stock before, during, and after 1997. For the purposes of Table 5 we similarly calculate the patent stock of target firms. Note that, unlike earlier sections, which considered the patents of only the top twenty-five firms, Table 5 reports patents acquired by all firms.
In Table 5 we observe that the stock of patents that changed hands through M&A transactions increase over time in nominal terms, though with some fluctuations in the 1980s. Yet the share of patents transferred with respect to the entire stock of ICT equipment patents gradually decreases from approximately 20 percent in the early 1980s to 12 percent in 2007. This observation holds for both the entire sample and high quality patents, with a share of the transfers 2 percent higher across the board for high quality patents.
The ratio of transfers increases dramatically when we change the denominator from the entire ICT equipment patents to patents of firms that conduct an acquisition. In the early years of our sample, the size of transferred patents corresponds to more than 30 percent of the acquirer patent stock, which decreases to 19 percent in 2007. We see a similar trend with a slightly lower transfer ratio in the entire patent sample.
The transfer of 12 percent of an industry's patents through M&A activity is a significant source of ownership change. However, we can compare the 14 percent approximate decrease in the ownership share of the top twenty-five firms in cumulative patent stock to the 12 percent of patents being transferred through acquisitions. Given that not all of the transferred patents go to the top twenty-five firms, the magnitude of transferred patents is not great enough to revert the deconcentration trend we established in our analyses. 
Composition of ownership: the model
Having established historical trends of patent stock ownership, we now turn our attention to combining demand-side and supply-side explanations in a fixed effects model. Table 3 presents the summary statistics used in the patent stock model. These variables are constructed in the same way as described for the flow analyses above, with the difference that we now use the depreciated stock of active patents instead of the flow of new patents. Keep in mind that the period for these patent stock analyses is a single year, as opposed to the two-year period in the flow section above.
In light of this information, we see that the number of firms grows at a pace of 9 percent each year and the number of patents grows at 10 percent.
As expected, recycling patents over their lifetime results in a lower new entry and lateral entry share: each year, 3.7 percent of the patents in a technology class belongs to new entrants, and another 2.7 percent belongs to lateral entrants. This implies that each year roughly 94 percent of the depreciated high quality patents stock belongs to firms that were active in the technology class in a prior year. When we increase the entry window to four years, the new entry increases six-fold to 26 percent per year, and lateral entry increases to 7.7 percent. The positions of IBM and Motorola appear slightly stronger in the patent stock than in the patent flow due to the cumulative impact of their prior patents, whereas AT&T remains roughly at the same position.
We now combine the various factors in the following fixed effects model:
where j is the technology class indicator and t is the time indicator. The list of regressors include new entry and lateral entry into technology classes, growth measures, and indicator variables for the presence of big firms, namely AT&T, Motorola, and IBM. We use two sets of entry measures, defined on one-year and four-year time windows. Similarly, we use two sets of growth measures, one for growth in the number of firms and a second for growth in the number of patents. We further divide these growth variables into two components: growth in US-based firms and patents and their foreign counterparts. The growth measures are highly correlated, therefore, we use either the firm-based or the patent-based measure in a single model. We also include the M&A intensity, the measure of transferred patents through M&A activity in a technology class.
We present the fixed effects model of patent stocks in Table 4 . The dependent variable in the model is ‫52ܥ‬ ௦௧ , the share of top twenty-five firms in cumulative patent stock up to the period of observation (indexed by t). All models include class and time fixed effects. 26 We clustered the standard errors by technology class. 27 The columns differ in the inclusion of different patents and the number of firm growth variables, as well as the time windows for the entry variables. Figure 4 reports the coefficient estimates of the time fixed effects from the model, which indicate a secular deconcentration over the years. On average, the concentration of a technologyclass in a year-group is 8.12 percent (=-9.61%-(-1.49%)) lower in 2007 than in 1987. In discussing the impact of other covariates below, we will occasionally compare the impact induced to this time impact of 8.12 percent to gauge a relative sense.
As our demand-side measure, M&A intensity does not have a statistically significant impact on market concentration. This is true for both the entire sample and the high-quality patents, implying that demand for ideas does not have a big impact on the concentration of ownership.
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On the supply side, the impact of top ten MSA share is also both statistically and economically significant across specifications for the high quality patents. An average level of top ten MSA share, 50 percent, results in increased concentration of 15.57 percent (=0.50 * 0.31), which is almost twice the magnitude of the deconcentration induced by time (8.12%). This results holds both for the top quartile and top decile patent samples; however, in the entire sample of patents, the share of top ten MSAs does not have a statistically significant impact on concentration.
This suggests that the forces that limit geographic diffusion of ideas are more prevalent in the geographic concentration of patent ownership than the replacement of large firms by metropolitan areas.
26 In unreported results we use a linear and a quadratic time trend instead of time fixed effects. The qualitative results remain the same in these alternative specifications. 27 Two-way clustering of the standard errors by class and time does not change our statistical inferences. 28 In unreported results we found that, by restricting the sample to the 10% highest-quality patents, M&A intensity has a marginally significant negative impact on concentration, but even this impact is economically small.
The results on new entry, which is a proxy for the patent-weighted entry of firms that were not active in ICT equipment previously, are mixed for the one-year entry window, but are quite robust for the four-year entry window. In the entire sample of patents, the new entry has a statistically and economically significant impact on the concentration: a yearly 2.3 percent entry The increase in the number of firms is also important, though this result is not robust across models and different samples based on patent quality. Similarly, the increase in the number of patents also lacks statistical significance.
The lateral entry, our proxy for economies of scope, is associated with an increase in the ownership of top firms, though the impact loses its statistical significance in some models. A technology class experiencing the average level of lateral entry, 2.7 percent per period, faces a 2.07 percent (=0.76 * 0.027) increase in ‫52ܥ‬ ௦௧ . This result may be driven by the fact that firms conducting lateral entry operate in multiple segments of the industry, hence they are expected to have a bigger operation than others, and the loss of statistical significance may be attributed to the slow pace of change in the stock of patents. Note that lateral entry in this context means having a high-quality patent in one ICT equipment class and producing a new high-quality patent in another ICT equipment class in which the firm did not have high-quality patents previously; having lowquality patents in either industry has no effect on the entry measure among high-quality patents.
The models suggest that the existence of AT&T as one of the top five patent owners in the 
Conclusion
In this article we characterize long-term trends related to the concentration of the origins of inventive ideas in the ICT equipment industry. Analyzing the concentration in granted patents in this industry from 1976 to 2010, we compare measured changes against popular assumptions about the size and scale of changes in invention.
Overall we find a substantial decline in concentration. The data show that the deconcentration arises in every measure of the trend. It is present in the cumulative ownership of active patents. We also show that the size and scope of the changes vary considerably, with some segments of ICT equipment undergoing much more dramatic changes in concentration.
We analyze evidence about the causes of this change. The statistical evidence is consistent with explanations that stress the role of supply-side changes more than demand-side changes. We present evidence that firm entry accounts for part of this deconcentration. Importantly, we reject the notion that non-US-firm entry is the sole cause of the change. We also reject the notion that one antitrust case, one company's strategic error, or the break-up of one large leading innovator of yesteryear accounts for this change in structure.
Furthermore, we show that the deconcentration results, as well as the results on the drivers of deconcentration, hold in the entire patent sample and in the high quality patent sample, across a variety of concentration measures.
The deconcentration of ownership results we obtain relate to the literature on Divided Technical Leadership (DTL) and, more broadly, to debates about the causes of market leadership and incentives in innovative activities. By distinguishing between product market leadership and technological leadership and focusing on the latter, we provide evidence of increased competition in the ideas market. This increased competition may be indicative of higher incentives to innovate, hence higher levels of inventive activity under a model where incentives increase monotonically with greater competition.
Finally, this is the first study to investigate the extent of the potentially countervailing M&A mechanism using a census of the M&A activity in the ICT Industry. First, we showed that there is a considerable transfer of patents through M&A, which relate to the literature on R&D incentives in an M&A context on one hand, and the start-up commercialization framework of Gans, Hsu, and Stern (2002) on the other. We then show that the size of the patent transfer through M&A is not enough to revert the composition of ownership to its pre-deconcentration levels. We conclude that the leading firms' strategies to externalize R&D activity has not reversed the trend towards deconcentration. Furthermore, M&A intensity does not have a statistically significant impact on the ownership concentration of ideas.
The study has several inherent limitations. The USPTO classification system we used constitutes a limitation. Though no single technology class dominates our data, the definition of these classes may depend on industry developments, which may have ramifications for our analyses. In addition, our data includes patents granted since 1976. This restriction truncates the patent stock variable for the early years of our sample, as we do not have information on active patents before 1976. Though the history of (de)concentration in electronics goes back much further in history, these data limitations prevent investigation of the earlier trends and causes.
Notes: Evolution of the patent application stock share for top twenty-five firms. Each row corresponds to a calendar year. The sample includes the highest quartile patents in the thirty patent technology classes in the ICT equipment industry, where quality is measured by citations received. The patent stock of a firm is the discounted sum of its unexpired patents that are applied for between 1976 and 2007 and are ultimately granted on or before 2010. , at all levels of patent quality. The level of observation is a firm-technology class level. In other words, a firm is counted in a bin if it has the specified amount of ownership share in that bin for a technology class. If a firm has shares in multiple technology classes, then it is counted multiple times. Only activity within the top quartile of patent stock is considered. The patent stock is the discounted sum of unexpired patents. Panel A presents the frequencies for the 1% to 5% range, while panel B presents for shares less than 1%. Table 4 . Regressions are ordinary least squares, the solid line represents the coefficient estimates, and the dashed lines indicate the 95% confidence intervals obtained from standard errors clustered by class. An observation is a patent technology class and a year. N is 660. Each model includes technology class and time fixed effects. The sample includes the highest quartile of patents in the period 1986 to 2007 that are ultimately granted by USPTO on or before 2010, where quality is measured by citations received.
